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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES-OWNER'S LIABILITY STATUTESAPPLICATION TO THE MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP
Plaintiffs were the driver and passengers in an automobile which
collided with a truck owned by defendant and being negligently
driven by its employee. The employee had defendant's permission to
drive the truck, but he was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The Michigan Owner's Liability
Statute provides that the owner of a motor vehicle is liable for any
injury resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle with the
owner's permission. On the basis of the statute, the trial court entered
judgment for the plaintiff and defendant appealed. Held, affirmed. The
owner's liability statute applies not only where the relationship between owner and driver is that of bailor and bailee, but also where
the relationship is that of master and servant. Moore v. Palmer, 86
N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 1957).
Prior to the enactment of the owner's liability statutes, the employerowner's liability for the negligence of the employee-driver was usually based on the principles of master and servant-i.e., the owner
was liable only if the servant was acting within the scope of his employment.' Thus, automobile owners were immune from liability
when the relationship between the owner and the driver was that of
bailor and bailee, and many innocent third parties were left to recover
from the ofttime financially irresponsible drivers.2 In order to protect
the public from such a result, many states have now enacted statutes
which attach liability to the owner who has permitted another person
to use his motor vehicle. 3 The constitutionality of these statutes is
predicated on the valid exercise of the police power of the state in
1. The common law doctrine holding the master liable for the negligent acts
of his employees, acting within the scope of their' employment, began to develop in the late seventeenth century. Michael v. Alestree, 2 Levinz 172

(K.B. 1676). The rule persists to the modern day of the automobile and has

been applied to a master whose servant operated his motor vehicle. Field
v. Evans, 262 Mass. 345, 159 N.E. 751 (1928).
2. The purpose of the owner's liability statute is to make the owner of the
automobile bear the loss, rather than the innocent third party. Kernan v.
Webb, 50 R.I. 394, 148 AtI. 186 (1929).
3. "The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for any injury occasioned
by the negligent operation of such vehicle .... The owner shall not be liable,
however, unless said motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or
implied consent or knowledge. .. ." MVcH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (1952). See also
CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 402 (DEERING SUPP. 1957); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.
493 (Supp. 1957); lVIINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.54 (1946); N.Y. VEHIcLE & TRAFFIc
LAW § 59; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-31-3 (1956).
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regulating the use of motor vehicles. 4 Jurisdictions having a statute
similar to that in Michigan have held the owner liable upon a mere
showing that the driver was operating the vehicle with the owner's
permission. 5 Other jurisdictions have a statute which raises a rebuttable presumption that the driver was acting in the owner's behalf,
thus placing upon the owner the burden of showing that the driver
was not acting within the scope of employment. 6 Jurisdictions not
having a statute bearing on the owner's liability hold that permissive
use of an automobile does not of itself furnish any basis for liability
7
on the part of the owner.
Some jurisdictions having an owner's liability statute similar to
that in Michigan have extended the application of the statute to the
master-servant relationship. 8 The court takes cognizance of the fact
that prior to the instant case the problem of when to apply the owner's
liability statute was in a state of confusion in Michigan. 9 In this decision the court endeavors to clear the area of doubt by saying that the
statute does not expressly exclude the master-servant relationship
from statutory application. The court reasoned that the statute was
intended to apply to all owners without exception, and reached the
conclusion that it is no defense for the employer to show that the
driver was acting without the scope of his employment, if it is proved
that the driver had the employer's consent to operate the vehicle.
The avowed purpose of the owner's liability statutes is the protection of the public. 10 At common law the employer was liable for all
the negligent acts of his employees acting within the scope of their
employment. The bailor, however, was immune from liability for
injuries caused by his negligent bailee. To remedy the latter situation
the owner's liability statutes were passed. The court in the instant
4. Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 170, 164 N.W. 520 (1917);
Atkins v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 261 N.Y. 352, 185 N.E. 408 (1933).
5. Montagna v. Brown, 31 Cal. 2d 642, 88 P.2d 745 (1939); Robinson v. Bruce
Rent-a-Ford Co., 205 Iowa 261, 215 N.W. 724 (1927); Ballman v. Brinker, 211

Minn. 322, 1 N.W.2d 365 (1942); Grant v. Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158, 156 N.E.
650, 652, (1927); Guerin v. Mongeon, 49 R.I. 414, 143 Atl. 674 (1928). But see
Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 74 N.W.2d 212 (1956), in which the Iowa
court refused to impute the negligence of the permissive driver to the owner
so as to preclude the owner from recovery for damages to his vehicle. The
case is discussed in 5 DRAKE L. REv. 127 (1956).
6. MAss. ANN. LAW, c. 231, § 85A; TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1037 (1956). See
Fitiles v. Umlah, 322 Mass. 325, 77 N.E.2d 212 (1948); Emert v. Wilkerson,
7 Tenn. App. 269 (1928).
7. Downes v. Norrell, 261 Ala. 430, 74 So. 2d 593 (1954); Graham v. Shilling,
133 Colo. 5, 291 P.2d 396 (1955); Mutual Cas. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America, 186 Va. 204, 42 S.E.2d 298 (1947).

8. Grant v. Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158, 164, 156 N.E. 650, 652 (1927); Guerin v.

Mongeon, 49 R.I. 414, 143 Atl. 674, 675 (1928).
9. See Gray v. Sawatzki, 272 Mich. 140, 261 N.W. 276 (1935), in which the

court used the scope of employment test.

10. "The purpose and effect of this statute is to protect the public ..
Steinle v. Beckwith, 198 Minn. 424, 270 N.W. 139, 141 (1936). See also Kernan
v. Webb, 50 R.I. 394, 148 Atl. 186 (1929).
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case does not limit the application of the statute to the bailor-bailee
situations, but uses it to extend the common law liability of the
master for the negligent acts of his servants, acting within or without
the scope of employment. The result seems undesirable. The employer, in order to continue in business must keep his vehicles on the
road, and by having the statute applied to employers, he cannot protect himself, except by extensive insurance coverage, from liability
arising from the negligent acts of his employees, acting without the
scope of their employment. It is suggested that the owner's liability
statutes should not be used by the courts to abrogate the well established common law doctrines applicable to an employer and his employees, unless the statutes are amended by the legislatures to abolish
the distinction between the master-servant and the bailor-bailee
relationships.

BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGE-FAILURE OF CREDITOR TO
INFORM BANKRUPTCY COURT OF BANKRUPT'S
FRAUD IN PROCURING LOAN
Following the bankrupt's discharge a creditor brought suit in a
state court to collect on a debt which had been listed on the bankruptcy schedule. The creditor asserted that his claim was not barred
by the discharge because of fraud and deceit in obtaining the loan
upon which his claim was based.' Had the bankruptcy court known
of this fraud, it presumably would have denied the discharge. 2 While
having notice of the bankruptcy proceedings, the creditor chose not
to take part therein. The bankrupt, by ancillary petition in the bankruptcy court, sought an injunction against the creditor's action. The
referee enjoined the creditor, but on petition for review his decision
11. It has been suggested that the liability for the negligence of employees

should be considered as one of the risks of business. This writer suggests that
the employer is sufficiently burdened under the deep pocket doctrine, that he
should not be forced to assume any further burdens.
1. "Debts not affected by a discharge.
"(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of
his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as ...
(2) are liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or
false representations ....
" 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35
(1952).
2. "Discharges, When granted.
"(c) The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has . . . (3) obtained money or property on credit, or obtained an extension or renewal of credit, by making or publishing or causing to be
made or published in any manner whatsoever, a materially false statement
in writing respecting his financial condition .

amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1952).

. .

."

30 STAT. 544 (1898),

as
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was reversed by the district court. On appeal, held, affirmed. The
Bankruptcy Act 3 does not impose a duty upon creditors to advise
the bankruptcy court of information which would preclude a discharge, and a creditor is thus not estopped to deny that his claim
was discharged, even though he deliberately fails to inform the bankruptcy court that the loan upon which his claim is based was fraudulently procured by the bankrupt. White v. Public Loan Co., 247 F.2d
601 (8th Cir. 1957).
The bankruptcy court, as a court of equity,4 has the power to grant
any appropriate and necessary injunctive relief in furtherance or aid of
its jurisdiction or decrees.5 The power and authority of the bankruptcy
court does not end with the discharge but may be invoked by the
bankrupt to secure the benefit of his discharge.6 However, under
the doctrine of Local Loan Co. v. Hunt" the bankruptcy court will

exercise this jurisdiction to pass upon the dischargeability of a particular debt only under exceptional circumstances. Normally, when
a creditor seeks to enforce his claim in a state court, the debtor must
then plead the discharge as a defense in that court.8
The bankruptcy court will grant a discharge of the bankrupt's
debts, unless it can be shown that the bankrupt was guilty of certain

specified conduct, 9 such as having fraudulently procured a loan,10
which will prevent his discharge. Generally speaking, a discharge in
bankruptcy releases the bankrupt from all of his provable debts."
There are, however, some classes of obligations, such as alimony due
-or to become due, which by their nature, apart from extrinsic circumstances, are not dischargeable. 12 Furthermore, extrinsic circumstances
3. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1952).
4. "Courts of bankruptcy . . .are invested 'with such jurisdiction at law
and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings.' Consequently this Court has held that for many
purposes 'courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their pro-ceedings inherently proceedings in equity.'. . . By virtue of § 2 [of the Bankruptcy Act] a bankruptcy court is a court of equity at least in the sense that
in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Act, it applies the
principles and rules of equity jurisprudence." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
303-04 (1939). "[Clourts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity,
and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity." Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
5. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234 (1934).

6. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
7. Ibid.
8. 6 Am. Jun., Bankruptcy § 313 (1950).

9. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1952).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 32 (c) (1952).

11. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1952).
12. Ibid. In California State Board of Equalization v. Coast Radio Products,
228 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1955), it was held that the Board could rely on the nondischargeable nature of its claim against the bankrupt and had no duty to
file a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings even though the assets were sufficient to have paid the claim. This case was not mentioned or referred to in
the opinion in the instant case.
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surrounding a particular claim may result in removal of that claim
from the operation of the discharge. Thus, fraud in the procurement
of a loan will prevent the discharge of the particular claim based upon
that loan.13 In In re Walton,14 a case essentially like the one at hand,
the creditor concealed the fact that the bankrupt had fraudulently
procured the credit. This fraud, if known to the bankruptcy court,
presumably would have been grounds for denying a discharge to the
bankrupt. After the bankruptcy proceedings the creditor sought to
enforce his claim against the bankrupt, asserting that, because of the
fraud, his claim was not within the operation of the discharge. He
was held estopped to deny that his claim was discharged.
The referee's decision to grant the injunction in the instant case
was based on the Walton case holding. 5 The district court judge re16
versed solely on the ground that the Walton holding was erroneous.
Although the court of appeals indicated that the result of the Walton
case might be desirable, it nevertheless affirmed the holding of the
district court, as it could find no express or implied duty imposed on a
creditor by the Bankruptcy Act to inform the bankruptcy court of
facts which would preclude a discharge of the bankrupt. In addition
the court said that a contrary decision would deprive the creditor of
the benefit of a valid right to claim the exemption granted under the
Bankruptcy Act.' 7 Inasmuch as the issue of special circumstances
which would give the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to pass on the
dischargeability of creditors' claims had not been raised below, the
court of appeals expressed no opinion on this feature of the case.
The judgment was affirmed without prejudice to the right of the
bankrupt to file an amended complaint alleging such special and
unusual circumstances as might exist which could be sufficient to
entitle the bankruptcy court to assert ancillary jurisdiction and
determine the dischargeability of the debt, if the bankrupt so desired.
An analysis of the cases would seem to indicate that courts have been
more zealous in protecting creditors than in carrying out the purpose
of the Bankruptcy Act, which was to allow unfortunate debtors a
chance at a fresh start. Naturally there will be cases where debtors
will take advantage of creditors, but the converse of this can also
13. See note 1 supra.
14. 51 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Mo. 1943).
15. 247 F.2d at 602.
16. Id. at 603. Two authorities in the bankruptcy field have commented
on the Walton case as follows: "The decision so holding treats the creditor
as estopped by his bad faith in not opposing discharge, as well as relying on
the so-called 'unusual circumstances' of his asserting inapplicability of the
discharge, and it would seem that the estoppel theory is the better basis for
the holding." 8 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3262 (6th ed. 1955).

"This decision

has absolutely no statutory basis to support it and must be regarded as erroneous." 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 14.07 n.4 (1956).

17. See note 1 supra.
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occur, as in the instant case. 18 In this case the creditor withheld information which would have precluded a discharge of the bankrupt.
This action in effect allowed him to obtain a preferred position as to
other creditors against later acquired property of the debtor. Thus
by his own questionable conduct he stands to benefit at the expense
of other creditors whose claims are barred by the discharge. Inasmuch as this case represents the current status of the law and
this court could find nothing in the statute to prevent the result
reached here, perhaps legislation would be in order to remedy the
situation. 19

BILLS AND NOTES-DEMAND INSTRUMENTS-TIME WHEN
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS TO RUN
Plaintiff-executrix brought an action against defendant to recover
judgment on a promisory note made by defendant payable to the
deceased. The note provided in part: "Demand after date we... promise to pay... with interest at 4 percent per annum from date payable
semi-annually."' It further provided that failure to pay any interest
installment within ten days after due date would cause the entire note
to become due and collectable at once. The statutory period of limitations for negotiable instruments was ten years. Since the action was
commenced more than ten years after execution of the note, defendant
pleaded the statute of limitations and moved to dismiss. Although
plaintiff contended that the statute did not begin to run on this particular note until actual demand for payment had been made, the
trial court dismissed the action. On appeal, held, affirmed. Even though
a demand note provides for payment of interest and acceleration of the
due date of the instrument upon default in payment of interest, its
character as a demand instrument is not changed and the statute of
limitations begins to run against such demand paper from the date of
execution. Stebens v. Wilkinson, 87 N.W.2d 16 (Iowa 1957).
Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act,2 section seven, an
instrument in which no time for payment is expressed is payable upon
18. A practice has grown up among certain type creditors where the debtor
is required to answer questions in writing, the full import of which he may
fail to comprehend, in a loan application and then if the debtor later becomes
insolvent, his answers are claimed to be fraud. Thus the creditor is in effect
insuring himself against the effects of a later discharge in bankruptcy barring
his claim. See 1 HANNA & MAcLACHLAN, CREDITORs' RIGHTS 365 (4th ed. 1949).

19. See Smedley, Bankruptcy Courts as Forums for Determining the Dischargeability of Debts, 39 IiNN. L. REV. 651 (1955).

1. Stebens v. Wilson, 87 N.W.2d 16 (Iowa 1957).
2. This act has been adopted in all American jurisdictions. 5 U.L.A., Negotiable Instruments xv-xlvi (1943).
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4
demand,3 unless the circumstances show a different intention. No
particular words such as "on demand" are necessary to make an instrument payable upon demand. 5 It is well settled that the statute
of limitations begins to run against ordinary demand paper from the
date of its execution, and not from the date of demand.6 The majority of
American jurisdictions hold that the fact that a demand instrument
also calls for the payment of interest does not change the time from
which the statute begins to run.7 Further, the fact that a note indicates
no time of payment but is expressed to be payable with interest an8
nually does not prevent it from being payable upon demand. These
positions seem to be based upon the theory that, as a demand note is
immediately payable when made, and as the statute runs from the
date that payment is due, the statute therefore runs from the date of
execution. 9 Some American jurisdictions, however, feeling that this is
an unrealistic approach, have adopted the rule that a provision for
the payment of interest takes a demand note out of the general rule
and that the statute does not begin to run until actual demand is
made.' 0 These courts feel that this view is more realistic and more
cognizant of actual business practices because a provision to pay interest is one circumstance tending to show that it was the intent of the
parties that the note was not to become due immediately."
In the instant case the court held that the note sued on was clearly
a demand note, although the words "demand after date" were used
instead of "on demand after date." Further, it was held that the provisions for payment of interest and for "acceleration" upon default of
interest payments did not affect the demand character of the note.
Applying the orthodox majority rules, the court concluded that the

3. MacKey v. Dobrucki, 116 Conn. 666, 166 Ati. 393 (1933); Carmen v.
Higginson, 245 Mass. 511, 140 N.E. 246 (1923); Coleman v. Page's Estate,
202 S.C. 486, 25 S.E.2d 559 (1943).
4. Glass v. Adoue & Lobit, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 21, 86 S.W. 798 (1905).
5. Kraft v. Thomas, 123 Ind. 513, 24 N.E. 346 (1890) ("When called for");
O'Neil v. Magner, 81 Cal. 631, 22 Pac. 876 (1889) ("on demand after date");
Love v. Perry, 19 Ga. App. 86, 90 S.E. 978 (1916) ("after date"). 10 C.J.S.,
Bills and Notes § 247(a) (1938).
6. Clark v. Gibbs, 69 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1934); Kraft v. Thomas, 123 Ind.
513, 24 N.E. 346 (1890); BRiTTON, BnLs AND NOTES § 161 (1943); Amnot., 44
A.L.R. 397 (1926).
7. Jones v. Nichole, 82 Cal. 32, 22 Pac. 878 (1889); House v. Peacock, 84
Conn. 54, 78 Ati. 723 (1911); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 397, 399 (1926).
8. Roberts v. Snow, 27 Neb. 425, 43 N.W. 241 (1889); Jillson v. Hill, 70
Mass. (4 Gray) 316 (1855) (interest within six months).
9. See note 7 supra.
10. Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Spiro, 141 Miss. 38, 106 So. 209 (1925); Boyd
v. Buchanan, 176 Mo. App. 56, 162 S.W. 1075 (1914); Baxter v. Beckwith, 25
Colo. App. 322, 137 Pac. 901 (1913); cf. Sullivan v. Ellis, 219 Fed. 694 (8th Cir.
1915); Blick v. Cockins, 131 Md. 625, 102 At. 1022 (1917).
11. Farmers and Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Cole, 184 Okla. 337, 87 P.2d 149
(1939).
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statute of limitations began to run from the date of execution of the
instrument and plaintiff's claim was thus barred. 12
If it is assumed that the orthodox majority rules should be followed,
the decision in the instant case is not open to question. However, as
is pointed out by the dissent, 13 as a practical matter the maker and
payee of a note do not expect it to be paid immediately; otherwise
there would be small reason for making the note. The dissenting judge
felt that the provisions for periodic interest (payable semi-annually)
and acceleration in default of interest were sufficient manifestations
to support a finding that the parties did not intend immediate payment. Thus the instrument would be brought within the minority
rule that if a note, although payable upon demand, fairly shows within
the four corners of the instrument that the parties intended that it
become due only upon actual demand, the statute of limitations does
not commence to run from the date of the execution of the note but
from the date of actual demand.14 It would seem that, viewed in the
light of present day business practices and transactions, this view is
the more realistic although admittedly it is not as exact and certain
in application as is the majority rule. There is the further possibility
that the court erred in its analysis of the note and that, because of
the provision for semi-annual payment of interest, it was in fact not
a demand note at all but a six month time note. Although this interpretation of the instrument is possible, the court seemed to give it
little attention, as the word "demand" appeared in the instrument
itself.

BILLS AND NOTES-HOLDER IN DUE COURSE-GIVING
A CHECK IN EXCHANGE FOR ANOTHER NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENT IS NOT THE GIVING OF VALUE WHEN
THE CHECK TURNS OUT TO BE WORTHLESS
Plaintiff-corporation, payee of a cashier's check, seeks recovery
from drawee-bank, which stopped payment on the check. Payment
12. The court excluded oral evidence tending to show that the parties
actually did not intend immediate payment, under the rule that parol evidence
is not admissible to vary the terms of a written instrument in the absence of
allegations of fraud, accident or mistake. See Furleigh v. Dawson, 245 Iowa
359, 62 N.W.2d 174 (1954). If the rule that the statute begins to run on all
demand paper from the date of execution is accepted, the only question is
whether or not the note is in fact demand paper, and the instant court correctly excluded the offered testimony. However, if the minority rule that the
governing consideration is the intent of the parties is followed, note the possibility of admitting this eiidence to clear up a patent ambiguity evidenced
by inconsistent provisions in the note-e.g., "demand" and "interest payable
semi-annually."
13. Instant case, 87 N.W.2d at 20.
14. Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Spiro, 141 Miss. 38, 106 So. 209 (1925).
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was stopped because the consideration given by plaintiff had failed. In
exchange for the cashier's check plaintiff had given a check which it
received from its agent. This latter check was returned unpaid to
defendant because of insufficient funds in the agent's personal checking
account. Plaintiff contended, however, that its giving of the agent's
check to defendant constituted value and that plaintiff is a holder
in due course of the cashier's check. On plaintiff's appeal from an adverse judgment, held, affirmed. A holder of a negotiable instrument
in exchange for which he has given a check which proves to be worthless has not given value for the other instrument and thus cannot be
a holder in due course. Dakota Transfer & Storage Co. v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 86 N.W.2d 639 (N.D. 1957).
Failure of consideration is a personal defense, good against one who
is not a holder in due course.1 Section 52 of the Negotiable Instrument
Law, in setting forth the requirements of a holder in due course, specifies among other things the giving of "value."2 In section 25 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law "value" is defined as "any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract." Relying on this definition,
most courts hold that one who gives a negotiable instrument executed
by himself or a third party in exchange for another instrument has
given value, 3 and subsequently acquired knowledge of infirmities in
the instrument which he received does not affect his status as a holder
in due course.4 A few courts qualify this rule, however, by requiring
that before a holder in such exchange can be said to have given value
the instrument which he transferred must have passed into the hands
of a holder in due course. 5 The theory of these courts seems to be
that before a holder of a negotiable instrument can be said to be a
holder in due course, he must show that that which he gave as value
1. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 28: "Absence or failure of consideration
is matter of defense as against any person not a holder in due course. .. "
2. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52: "A holder in due course is a holder
who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:

"3. That he took in good faith and for value.. . ." (Emphasis added.)

3. Matlock v. Scheuerman, 51 Ore. 49, 93 Pac. 823, 827 (1908): "Where ...
there is an exchange of commercial paper, each instrument forms a sufficient
consideration for the other . . . and each is an independent obligation not
conditional on the payment of the other."
Miller v. Marks, 46 Utah 257, 148 Pac. 412, 417 (1914):

"The rule . . . is

quite well settled that an exchange of commercial paper, notes, checks, or
bills is a sufficient consideration, each for the other... Upon such an exchange
the particular transaction between the parties is consummated, and is not
executory merely; each party becoming a holder for a valuable consideration."
See also Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Ins. Co., 94
N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920); BRITTON, BILLs AND NOTES § 98 (1943).
4. Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152,
109 Atl. 296 (1920) ; Miller v. Marks, 46 Utah 257, 148 Pac. 412 (1914) ; Pennoyer
v. Dubois State Bank, 35 Wyo. 319, 249 Pac. 795 (1926); BRITTON, BILLS AND
NOTES § 98 (1943).

5. See, e.g., Cartier v. Morrison, 232 Mich. 352, 205 N.W. 108 (1952), dis-

approved in 24 MIc. L. REV. 714 (1926).
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is now a binding obligation upon him.6 The basis of this theory is a
possible implication from section 54 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, which provides that one who has not paid the full amount agreed
to be paid is only a holder in due course as to the amount paid prior
to receiving knowledge of some infirmity in the instrument he holds.
The implication is that a mere promise to pay does not constitute
value under this section, in contrast to section 25.7 Thus, a transferee
who acquires knowledge of any infirmity in the instrument he holds
prior to payment or transfer to a holder in due course of the instrument which he gave in exchange is precluded from being a holder in
due course, except as to any amount already paid.8
The instant court is apparently adopting the minority view 9 concerning the exchange of negotiable instruments as the giving of value.
It does not so state, but the opinion gives the impression that if the
bank had negotiated the check received from plaintiff to an innocent
third party, a holder in due course, the result would be different. 10
This controversy is, however, between the original parties, and according to the court, this is determinative." Since the plaintiff indorsed
to the bank a check which eventually proved to be worthless, the
court concludes that the plaintiff did not give value so as to become
a holder in due course according to the requirements of section 52 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law. 12 Since he is not a holder in due
course, plaintiff is vulnerable to the defense of failure of considera13
tion.
6. Cartier v. Morrison, supra note 5. The court in Pennoyer v. Dubois
State Bank, 35 Wyo. 319, 249 Pac. 795, 798-99 (1926) in rejecting this position,
states it as follows: "But there is authority for holding that the plaintiff, to
avoid the effect of section 54, and to sustain the burden of proving that it
was a holder in due course, was required to prove that the certificates of
deposit had been negotiated and that the plaintiff had either paid or become
liable to pay them to some one other than the payee."
7. BRANNAN, NEcOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 721-22 (7th ed., Beutel 1948)
comments on section 54 as follows: "The words 'before he has paid the full
amount agreed to be paid therefor' read by themselves are susceptible to two
meanings: (1) before the transferee has given the ultimate cash for the instrument or (2) before he has completed the transaction involved.
"If the first interpretation be adopted then giving credit by banks, giving
negotiable instruments, and other promises to pay in the future, would not
constitute value and the holder would be a holder in due course only in so
far as he had liquidated his obligation before notice of the infirmity. This
is the position which had been taken by many courts before the act and some
since; but it is submitted that it is contrary to the spirit of the act and the
specific purpose of secs. 25, 26 and 27, which clearly adopt the business point
of view that a credit transaction may be complete payment."
8. Ibid.
9. See Cartier v. Morrison, 232 Mich. 352, 205 N.W. 108 (1925), 24 Micu.
L. REv. 714 (1926); BRITTON, BILLS AND NoTEs § 98 (1943).
10. "The rights of innocent holders for value without notice are not involved
in this case." Instant case, 86 N.W.2d at 644.
11. "The controversy here is between the original parties. The plaintiff has
lost no rights that it had before the issuance of the cashier's check." Id. at 644.
12. See note 2 supra.
13. See note 1 supra.
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The plaintiff obviously gave value under what appears to be the
better view of the effect of the exchange of negotiable instruments. 14
When he negotiated the check to the bank he became secondarily liable
as an indorser of the instrument, further transfer being unnecessary. 5
The facts of this case also give rise to another point of law which,
it is submitted, could quite appropriately have been considered by
the court. Since the plaintiff received the check from its agent, who
knew it was worthless, the question arises whether the agent's knowledge should be imputed to the plaintiff.'& Such imputation, if made,
could prevent plaintiff's being a holder in due course by reason of bad
faith. A possible basis for not imputing the agent's knowledge is the
application of the rule that knowledge will not be imputed where the
agent was acting adversely to his principal. Here the agent acted
adversely in squandering his principal's money, for which arrearage
the bad check was given in an attempt to rectify the situation."' The
question under this fact situation then turns on whether or not the
plaintiff-principal, who is seeking to retain the benefit of its agent's
adverse act, changed its position prior to learning that the agent's
act was adverse to its interest as principal. 8 If it did change its
position, knowledge will not be imputed, and the plaintiff will not be
14. See BrTTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 98 (1943).
15. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 66: "[Hie [indorser] engages that on
due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be,
according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder,
or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it."
16. As a general proposition an agent's knowledge, in the course of employment and material to the business, is imputed to his principal. See e.g.,
Reardon v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 138 Conn. 510, 86 A.2d 570 (1952); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 272 (1933); TIFFANY, AGENCY § 108 (2d ed., Powell 1924).

This rule is based on the presumption that the agent will disclose his knowledge to his principal. For a criticism of this rule as fiction see MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY 90-91 n.22 (4th ed. 1952).

An exception to this rule arises,

however, when the agent's acts are adverse to his principal's interests.
MECHEM. OUTLINES OF AGENCY 90-91 n.22 (4th ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY

§ 280 (1933); TIFFANY, AGENCY § 110 (2d ed. Powell 1924). In such cases
knowledge will not be imputed. See Bank v. McDonald, 107 Ark. 232, 154
S.W. 512 (1913); Mutual Assur. Co. v. Norwich Say. Soc., 128 Conn. 510, 24
A.2d 477 (1942).
17. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 282, comment f (1933): "The rule applies although the agent in obtaining the benefit for the principal is doing so to
return to the principal something of which he has wrongfully deprived him, or
is reimbursing him for property wrongfully taken from him."
18. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 282(2) (c) (1933): "The principal is affected
by the knowledge of an agent although acting adversely to the principal if,
before he has changed his position the principal knowingly retains a benefit
received through the act of the agent which otherwise he would not have
received."
Comment f at 629-30: "If the principal receives a benefit as the result of the
conduct of an agent, he cannot keep the benefit and escape responsibility for
the means by which it has been acquired, unless he takes as a bona fide
purchaser . . . or unless there is

otherwise a

change in

conditions." The

italicized portion has been changed to in his position in RESTATEMENT 2d,

AGENCY § 282, comment h at 14 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1957).
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precluded from holding in due course on this account.19 If there was
a change of position by plaintiff, it was its act in becoming secondarily
liable on the check which it negotiated to the bank. However, if
this did not constitute a change of position on the plaintiff's part,
knowledge will be imputed, thereby preventing plaintiff's being a
holder in due course. 20 Another point, touched by the court, but not
employed as a basis for decision, is whether a payee can be a holder
in due course.21 The court alludes to the idea that a payee cannot be
a holder in due course, which position, if taken, would have excluded
the necessity for any consideration of the giving of value. In apparent
contradiction, however, the opinion also conveys the idea that the
only bar to the plaintiff's being a holder in due course is the fact that
it did not give value, as required by section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.2 2 Regrettably, in the final analysis it appears that the
instant decision is not in accord with the better reasoning concerning
the giving of value and is unclear concerning whether a payee can
be a holder in due course.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-USE OF
PERJURED TESTIMONY AND SUPPRESSION OF
MATERIAL EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO ACCUSED
IN STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner, after trial and conviction in a state court for the murder
of his wife, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, asserting that the state held him in confinement without according him
due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment of
the Constitution of the United States. His contentions were, in substance, that the sole basis of his conviction was perjured testimony,
which was knowingly used by the prosecuting authorities and also
that these authorities suppressed evidence which would have, apart
from impeaching the testimony given against him, corroborated his
19. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Tulsa Industrial Loan & Inv. Co., 83 F.2d 14 (10th

Cir. 1936).

20. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Tulsa Industrial Loan & Inv. Co., supra note 19.
Although the court here found a change in position, it pointed out that: "If
before his position has been changed, the principal learns the facts and kmowingly retains a benefit obtained through the acts of the agent which he would
not have received otherwise, he cannot escape responsibility." Id. at 17.
21. See Note, 30, So. CALIF. L. REV. 109 (1956) for a discussion of this problem.
22. "Clearly the plaintiff did not qualify under the provisions of Subd. 3 of
Section 41-0502, NDRC 1943

[NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw

§ 52 (3)]

...

be-

cause the plaintiff had not parted with anything of value." Instant case, 86
N.W.2d at 644.
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claim that the act was committed in a fit of passion.' The trial court refused to issue the writ, and the state appellate court affirmed. On
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court,2 held, reversed.
Due process of law is denied in a state criminal proceeding when
the conviction is based upon testimony known by the prosecution to
be perjured and the prosecution suppressed material evidence which
would have disclosed the perjury and tended to establish a defense.
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
Although the limitations placed upon criminal procedures in the
federal courts under the Bill of Rights, including the due process clause
of the fifth amendment, do not extend to the state courts, 3 the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment restricts the freedom
possessed by the states in the making and enforcement of their
criminal laws. 4 The state is free to regulate the procedure of its
courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in
doing so it "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."5
To preserve the fundamental concepts of a fair hearing the Supreme
Court will vacate a conviction in cases where the state has hurried
the accused to conviction under mob domination,6 deprived the
accused of the aid of counsel, 7 tried the accused before a biased
judge,8 or contrived a conviction based upon confessions obtained
from the accused by violence.9
The doctrine that the knowing use of perjured testimony and
the knowing suppression of evidence amounts to a denial of due
process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment is relatively new.
It was first considered in the case of Mooney v. Holohanm' in which the
Court stated, though in dictum, that a criminal conviction procured
by state prosecuting authorities by the knowing use of perjured
1. Petitioner relied on a Texas statute treating killing under influence of
sudden passion arising from adequate cause, as murder without malice. A
witness for the state gave testimony inconsistent with petitioner's claim
that he had come upon his wife, whom he had already suspected of marital

infidelity, kissing such witness in a parked automobile. After the trial,
the witness admitted he had had sexual intercourse with petitioner's wife on

many occasions, which fact was known by the prosecutor during the trial.

2. The procedure involved in the instant case was a review of a final decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The Texas court had refused to issue a state writ of habeas corpus. Federal habeas corpus was not
involved.
3. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
4. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
5. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (opinion by Justice
Cardozo).
6. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). But see Soulia v. O'Brien, 94
F. Supp. 764 (D. Mass. 1950) (mistakes of counsel in and of themselves are
not enough for habeas corpus).
8. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
9. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

10. 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (dictum).
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testimony was a denial of due process of law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. The dictum of Mooney was adopted in
Pyle v. Kansas," a case in which prosecuting officials coerced and
threatened witnesses, with the result that evidence was suppressed
and perjured. Although stressing that each case depends upon its
own facts, recent federal 2 and state13 decisions indicate a willingness
to adopt the rule if the circumstances warrant its application. It
has been applied in cases of suppression where the prosecutor has
5
failed to call witnesses, 14 failed to produce real evidence or exhibits,
or merely disregarded keenly pertinent evidence. 16 The evidence
suppressed must be material, 7 that is, it must be of such nature that
had it been disclosed, the judge or jury would have been likely to
consider it in reaching a conclusion. 18 In the case of perjured testimony, as is true of suppression of evidence, the courts require that
such testimony must be knowingly used before due process is violated,19 but the materiality of the perjured testimony does not seem
to be controlling, 20 however, a mere allegation of the use of perjured
testimony without any specification as to what the false testimony
was is not sufficient to prove that perjured testimony was knowingly
21
used.
In the instant case the Court carefully applied the standards developed for vacating a conviction based upon suppressed and perjured
11. 317 U.s. 213 (1942).
12. Bales v. Lainson, 244 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1957); Lister v. McLeod, 240 F.2d
16 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. Jackson, 153 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. N.Y. 1957).
13. State v. Mayo, 95 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1957); Height v. Director, Patuxent
Institution, 209 Md. 645, 120 A.2d 911 (1956); Missouri v. Eaton, 280 S.W.2d
63 (Mo. 1955).
14. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955);
United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952) (evidence
suppressed was not relevant to issue of whether petitioner was guilty or not
guilty but was relevant to the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner).
15. United States ex tel. Montgomery v. Ragan, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill.
1949) (prosecuting authorities suppressed evidence of a doctor's examination
which would have proved that crime of rape had not been committed).
16. United States v. Rutkin, 212 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1954).
17. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 765 (3d Cir. 1955)
("vital evidence, material to the issues of guilt or penalty."); Morton v.
United States, 147 F.2d 28 (1945).
18. Soulia v. O'Brien, 94 F. Supp. 764 (D. Mass. 1950). If the evidence
would have been merely cumulative, vague or confusing, the prosecutor has
violated no duty in not disclosing. See, e.g., Jordon v. Bondy, 114 F.2d 599
(D.C. Cir. 1940); Cummings v. United States, 15 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1926);
Ex parte Mooney, 10 Cal. 2d 1, 73 P.2d 554 (1937).
19. Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942).
20. "A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is in anyway relevant
to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct
what he knows to be false and elicit the truth." People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d
554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854 (1956).
21. Lister v. McLeod, 240 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1957). See Wild v. Oklahoma,
187 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1951) (where allegation was merely one of perjury by
a witness with no suggestion that it was knowingly used by prosecuting
officials).
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evidence. Adhering to the rule of Mooney v. Holohan22 and Pyle
v. Kansas,2 3 the Court holds that the petitioner was not accorded
due process of law. In Mooney and Pyle the Court was faced with a
situation in which the prosecutor obtained perjured testimony or
concealed the existence of evidence from the defense by affirmative
action. 24 The present holding would extend the Mooney doctrine to
situations in which the prosecutor obtained a conviction through
negative acts. Here the prosecutor did not coerce, threaten or otherwise procure a witness to testify falsely but merely remained silent
when he knew that a states' witness was giving false testimony. He did,
however, encourage the witness not to volunteer information which
would materially aid the defendant. The likelihood of prejudice in
this situation is obvious. It is reasonable to assume that the prosecutor
who elicited this testimony knew that had the facts been truthfully
portrayed to the jury, a different decision might have been reached.
Based upon considerations of ethical and moral principals the
decision in the instant case appears sound. As stated in the American
Bar Association canons of ethics, the prosecutor's primary duty is
not to convict, but to see that justice is done, and credible evidence
that might tend to prove the accused's innocence should not be suppressed. 25 Unfortunately this basic premise of fair trial is often sacrificed for the sake of conviction. With the exception of New York,26
it is difficult to find state decisions which adhere to the rule with any
degree of consistency, and reluctance to invade the province of the
states27 has restricted Supreme Court interference. The fraud practiced on the court by suppression and use of perjured evidence appears to be as destructive as mob violence. In relation to the guarantee of due process, such a trial may result in a greater deprivation of
rights than a conviction based upon no evidence at all. A conviction
based upon no evidence at all could be reversed on examination of
the record by a reviewing court. The error in the instant case would
rarely come to light.
22. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).

23. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
24. The prosecuting officials threatened and coerced the witnesses thereby
concealing evidence from the defense. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 106-07
(1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).
25. A.B.A. Canons of Ethics, Canon 5., See also A Code of Trial Conduct:
Promulgated by the College of Trial Lawyers, 43 A.B.A.J. 223 (1957).

26. People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853 (1956); People v.

Riley, 83 N.Y.S.2d 281 (County Ct. 1948).

27. Ashe v. United States ex rel. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424 (1926); Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123 (1906); Maxwell
v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Dunn v.
Lyons, 23 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 622 (1928).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS-EXECUTORY INTEREST CONDITIONED UPON
RACIAL RESTRICTION ON USE OF LAND
Plaintiffs, Negro property owners, brought an action to quiet title
and for a declaratory judgment, asserting that their predecessor in
title had entered into a racially restrictive covenant with other owners
of a certain tract of land, including plaintiffs' lot, which placed a cloud
on the title. The covenant was an agreement that no owner would
sell or lease the property to any colored person and was enforceable
by automatic forfeiture to the nonviolating owners who recorded
notice of their claim.' Defendants contended that the covenant created
an executory interest 2 in the land, which vested in the defendants automatically upon the happening of the specified event and thus did not
involve state action. The lower court held that enforcement of the
restrictive covenant would be a violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment and therefore removed the enforceability of the covenant as a cloud upon the title. Held, affirmed. Covenants not to sell to members of a particular race do not change their
character whether denominated "executory interests" or "future
interests," and no rights, duties or obligations can be based thereon,
as they are a violation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. Capitol FederalSay. and Loan Ass'n v.
Smith, 316 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1957).
Racial restrictions upon the sale or use of land were generally upheld
as valid and enforceable 3 until the Supreme Court, in Shelley v.
1. The covenant further provided against occupancy by any colored person,
and in addition to the forfeiture clause provided for an action for damages
against any person who violated the restriction, and for enforcement of rights
of nonviolating owners by actions for specific performance, abatement, ejectment, or by injunction. The covenant was dated May 9, 1942 and was to have
effect until Jan. 1, 1990. Capitol Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 316
P.2d 252, 254 (Colo. 1957).
2. An executory interest is the possibility or prospect of an estate, which
exists by reason of the limitation of a freehold estate subject to a condition
precedent, and which cannot be regarded as a contingent remainder. 2 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY §§ 363-67 (3d ed. 1939). It is distinguished by these characteristics: on the happening of a condition or event, an estate vests in the holder
of the executory interest; it must vest in some person other than the creator
of the interest; with the exception of the executory interest after the determinable fee and the fee simple conditional, it vests in derogation of a vested
freehold estate; on the happening of the condition or event, it may become a
present interest automatically, no entry or election being necessary. 1 SIMES,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 149 (1936). It is subject to the rule against perpetuities.
TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, §§ 391-401. For a full discussion of executory interests,
see 19 Am. JuR., Estates §§ 95-134 (1939).
3. See Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 466, 474 (1949). Some courts had held that a
restriction restraining the sale of land to a particular race was an unlawful
restraint on alienation; while others, including Colorado, held that restrictions
as to sale were not invalid. There was general agreement that restrictions as
to use and occupancy did not constitute unlawful restraints on alienation. Id.
at 489, 491 and cases cited.
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Kraemer,4 held that a judicial decree granting specific enforcement of
a private agreement restricting the use of land to a single race is
state action violative of the equal protection clause. State action was
defined as positive action which could fairly be attributable to any
agency, branch or level of government of the state.5 Later decisions
expanded the state action concept to include the awarding of damages
for a breach of a racially restrictive covenant, 6 and the operation of
a school, for white boys only, by a board acting as a trustee of private
funds, where the board was appointed under a state statute and functioned as an agency of the City of Philadelphia. 7 The decision in the
Shelley case and subsequent cases made the effectiveness of such
covenants depend on voluntary compliance with their terms by the
contracting parties; it was not held to be unlawful to make agreements
involving racial restrictions, nor to secure compliance with their provisions, unless the method of enforcement constitutes state action in
violation of the Federal Constitution. 8
4. 334 U.S. 1 (1948), 2 VAND. L. REV. 119. In Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948), a similar decision was rendered as to the District of Columbia, on the
grounds of federal public policy. These decisions attracted great interest and
much comment. See Ming, The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. Cm. L. REv.
203 (1949).
5. 334 U.S. at 14. "State action, as that phrase is understood for purposes
of the fourteenth amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms."
Id. at 20. ". . . State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or
executive proceedings" is subject to review under the fourteenth amendment.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883). For a complete history and a study
of the requirements of state action under the fourteenth amendment, see 1
RACE REL. L. REP. 613 (1956).
6. Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 247 P.2d 99 (1952), af'd, 346
U.S. 249 (1953).
7. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
One Girard left a fund to the city of Philadelphia in trust for the education
of "poor white male orphans." The college was established and was operated
by a Board of City Trusts, appointed under a Pennsylvania statute. The
Supreme Court held that the board was an agency of the state and consequently was forbidden by the fourteenth amendment from .operating, even
as a trustee of private funds, a school excluding Negroes because of race.
In subsequent action in the case, the Philadelphia Orphan's Court directed
the removal of the board as trustee effective upon the appointment of a substitute trustee by the court. In re Estate of Stephen Girard, Orphan's Court,
No. 10. Philadelphia County, Pa., July Term, 1885, Sept. 11, 1957, aff'd, 138
A.2d 844 (Pa. 1958).
8. So long as the purposes of the agreements are effectuated by voluntary
compliance with their terms, there is no state action and the provisions of
the fourteenth amendment have not been violated. The fourteenth amendment
"erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory ......
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App.
2d 534, 247 P.2d 99 (1952), aff'd, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). In Claremont Improvement Club, Inc. v. Buckingham, 89 Cal. App. 2d 32, 200 P.2d 47 (1948),
declaratory relief to establish the validity of a racially restrictive covenant
•was refused because such covenants are not unconstitutional insofar as voluntary adherence to their terms is concerned, but are merely unenforceable
by the state judicial process. It would seem, however, that although voluntary
adherence to the terms of a racially restrictive covenant does not violate
the Constitution, under the decision in Shelley that it is an agreement to which
the law attaches no legal or equitable obligations, the covenant loses its
effectiveness; for "[ijt is perfectly true that the covenants take life from
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Subsequently, the Shelley case was distinguished by the North
Carolina court in CharlottePark and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer,9
which involved a racial restriction in the form of a determinable
fee. The court held that the determinable fee, which, upon the happening of a specified event, terminates by its own limitation and automatically reverts to the grantor, operates without judicial enforcement
by the state courts, and is therefore valid since it involves no state
action. The instant case raises the similar problem of the automatic
vesting of an estate in the holder of an executory interest. The court,
relying on Shelley v. Kraemer, held that this was a racial restriction
violative of the fourteenth amendment. The court simply stated that
"high sounding phrases or outmoded common law terms cannot alter
the effect of the agreement ..
."10 Although state action had to be
found in order to bring the case within the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment, the court does not make it clear how state action
is involved in this situation. In dispensing with the automatic forfeiture question, the court apparently takes the position that for it
to recognize any racial restriction as binding, no matter what its form,
would be unconstitutional.
It is unfortunate that in the instant case the court did not see fit to
discuss more fully the reasoning behind its decision. Assuming that
the language created a valid executory interest, the court was
court enforcement and that without it the discrimination they implement
would wholly fail." Comment, 45 M1cr. L. REV. 733, 741 (1947). "In holding
that a covenant is valid and yet unenforceable, the court overlooked the case
of Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, (4 Wallace 535) [18 L. Ed. 403 (1866)]
holding that a right without a remedy is as if it were not; that the inability to
enforce a contract leaves nothing but an abstract right of no practical value
and renders the protection of the Constitution a shadow and a delusion."

Askew, Restrictive Covenant Cases, 12 GA. B. J. 277, 283 (1948).

9. 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied sub nom., Leeper v.
Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n, 350 U.S. 983 (1956), 9 VAND L. REV.
561. The case was an action for declaratory judgment, involving a deed which
contained, in addition to the restriction and reversion provision, a condition
precedent to the reversion that the grantor should pay $3500 to the grantee.
This condition was required to be met before the land should revert to the
grantor. A determinable fee, in fact, terminates and reverts automatically.
However, the court characterized the restriction, not as a covenant, but as
a determinable fee, saying, "The operation of this reversion provision is not
by any judicial enforcement by the State Courts of North Carolina, and Shelley
v. Kraemer ... has no application." Id. at 123. This problem was anticipated
in 2 VAND. L. REV. 119, 122 (1948). See also Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 466, 473-74
(1949), commenting that a limitation upon the estate granted may accomplish
purposes otherwise unobtainable. For a discussion of the determinable fee,

see 1 TIFFANY,

REAL PROPERTY

§ 220 (3d ed. 1939).

10. Instant case, 316 P.2d at 255
11. If the executory interest is invalid for other than constitutional reasons,
there is no problem. If the covenant did, in fact, create a valid executory
interest, it might have been held invalid as a violation of the rule against
perpetuities. A future interest is invalid unless it is certain that it must
vest within the period of perpetuities; probability of vesting, however great,
is not enough. The period involved in the instant case was 48 years. See note
1 supra.For a discussion of the rule and its application, see Leach, Perpetuities
In a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REV. 638, 642 (1938).
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squarely confronted with the problem of state action. In striking down
the racial restriction the court made no clear analysis of this problem.
Extending the state action concept to the instant case seems to require a holding that the state acts in taking recognition of an accomplished fact, the automatic vesting of title, made possible by the operation of a common law device for creating interests in land. In this
regard, it is settled that state enforcement of a common law practice
is state action, just as is enforcement of legislation embodying the
practice. 12 Since land may be transferred only by grace of the state,
by means which the state has provided, it could be said that judicial
approval of a common law method of conveyancing is state control of
private action, which is, in fact, state action. Failure to prevent the
vesting of title in the holder of the executory interest in this situation
could be termed "state sanction" or "passive" state action. 3 Carrying
the state action doctrine a step further, it has been suggested that the
decision in Shelley v. Kraemer raises the question of whether or not
the enforcement of all private acts of discrimination is within the
fourteenth amendment, since they ultimately depend upon state action.14 Whether the court in the instant case employed any such reasoning is impossible to tell. The decision does little to resolve the question
of the validity of such devices used to effectuate a racial restriction.
However, in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the restrictive covenant 5 and school segregation
cases,' 6 and the policy enunciated therein, their validity seems rather
dubious at best.

CRIMINAL LAW-FORMER JEOPARDY-RETRIAL ON
GREATER OFFENSE AFTER CONVICTION OF
LESSER OFFENSE IS REVERSED ON APPEAL
Defendant was tried on counts of arson and of causing death! by
arson, which constitutes murder in the first degree. The court in12. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321
(1941).
13. 9 VAND. L. REv. 561 (1956). It is not a novel idea that state inaction
is to be regarded as state action. Hyman, Segregation And The Fourteenth
Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REV. 555, 569 (1951); cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953); Catlette v. United States, 152 F.2d 902, 907

(4th Cir. 1943). For
RACE REL. L. REP.

n discussion of state action as including state inaction, see 1
613,631 (1956).

14. Hyman, supra note 13, at 565. The analysis is persued to its ultimate
conclusion in Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and
"Economic" compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935), and Hale, Rights Under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by
Private Individuals, 6 LAw. GUILD REV. 627 (1946).

15. See note 4 supra.
16. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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structed the jury that under the first count defendant could be found
guilty of arson, and that under the second count the defendant could
be found guilty of first or second degree murder. The court treated
second degree murder as included within the instruction on murder
in the first degree. From a verdict of guilty of arson and second degree
murder' the defendant appealed and the judgment was reversed. In
a second trial he was found guilty of first degree murder, despite his
asserted defense of former jeopardy. On certiorari from the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the second conviction, heZd,
reversed. A verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, under an
indictment for murder in the first degree, amounts to an acquittal of
the charge of murder in the first degree; and any second trial for first
degree murder violates the accused's constitutional right not to be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184 (1957).
The Federal Constitution 2 and many state constitutions 3 guarantee
that once a defendant has been acquitted of a crime he shall be free
from the possibility of conviction of the same offense by a second trier
of fact. The reason generally given for this principle is that the individual has limited resources and the state should not be allowed to
try the individual repeatedly, thus undesirably increasing the chances
of conviction. 4 When the defendant is charged with an offense, is convicted of a lesser included offense, appeals from the conviction and a
new trial is granted, the question is whether the defendant can only be
retried for the same offense of which he was convicted or whether he
may also be retried for the greated offense of which he was acquitted.
Approximately half of the states that have considered the question
1. The dissenting opinion in the instant case states that the finding of arson
and second degree murder made "him [Green] guilty of all the elements
necessary to convict him of the first degree felony murder with which he was
charged.... ." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957). It would seem
that the two convictions do not necessarily result in first degree murder,
death caused by arson, because in the initial trial the jury apparently believed
that arson was not the cause of death but that defendant had caused the death
by other means sufficient to convict defendant of murder in the second
degree.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. I, § 8; FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights § 12 (1944);
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 10.
4. 355 U.S. at 187. Generally a state cannot appeal from an acquittal or to
impose a more severe penalty: State v. Dulaney, 87 Ark. 17, 112 S.W. 158
(1908); Commonwealth v. Fenwick, 177 Ky. 685, 198 S.W. 32 (1917). And
where a verdict of guilty is returned against the defendant, he appeals, and
the intermediate state appellate court reverses for defendant, the state cannot appeal to the higher appellate court. State v. B'Gos, 175 Ga. 627, 165 S.E.
566 (1932). The federal government generally cannot appeal. United States
v. Weissman, 266 U.S. 377 (1924); United States ex. rel. West Va. Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Bittner, 11 F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 1926). For instances where a state
can appeal-generally at the stage of proceedings before trial-see 2 AM.
JUR.,

Appeal and Error§ 227 (1936).
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have held that the defendant cannot be retried for the greater offense,5
while the others hold that the retrial can include the greater offense of
which the defendant was formerly acquitted.6 In reviewing these decisions on state offenses the Supreme Court has held 7 that the retrial
for the greater offense is not a violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
In Trono v. United States,8 a case originating in the local courts of
the Philippine Islands, the defendants were indicted for murder but
were convicted of the lesser offense of assault. They appealed to the
Philippine Supreme Court, which, in accordance with local practice,
entered a judgment of guilty of murder without remanding the case for
retrial. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, 9 holding that the
defendants, by appealing, waived 10 their immunity from double jeopardy. The Court's reasoning was that if the defendants sought complete acquittal they assumed the risk of being found guilty of the
greater offense originally charged.
The instant case involved a federal criminal prosecution originating
in a federal district court. In this situation, at least one lower federal
court had previously held that the retrial could not include the greater
offense of which the defendant had originally been acquitted." In the
majority of the lower federal courts, however, the Trono case has
been used as authority for the proposition that the retrial can include
the greater offense. 12 The instant case definitely establishes that this
previous interpretation of the Trono case is not to be followed 13 and
that when one is convicted in a federal court of a lesser included offense and appeals, any new trial cannot consider greater offenses of
which he was acquitted.14 The majority opinion in the instant case
distinguishes Trono and treats the case as one of first impression, while
5. Examples of this group are: People v. Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376 (1854); Simmons
v. State, 156 Fla. 353, 22 So. 2d 802 (1945) (dictum). The dissenting opinion in
the Green case lists seventeen states in this group. 355 U.S. at 217.
6. Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 152 Ky. 805, 154 S.W. 919 (1913) (dictum);
State v. Stallings, 334 Mo. 1, 64 S.W.2d 643 (1933). In these jurisdictions note
the inapplicability of the rationale of Simmons v. State, supra note 5. The
Green case lists nineteen states in this group. 355 U.S. at 216.
7. Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1910). The Georgia constitution expressly allowed a second trial for the same offense if the defendant appealed.
8. 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
9. Id. at 535.
10. Id. at 533.
11. United States v. Owens, 2 Alaska 480 (1905), decided four months prior
to the Trono case.
12. Green v. United States, 236 F.2d 708, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1956), rev'd, 355
U.S. 184 (1957); Salta v. United States, 44 F.2d 752 (1st Cir. 1930); United
States v. Gonzales, 206 Fed. 239 (W.D. Wash. 1913). Actually the exact question
was not before the Court in Trono because there was no retrial. An upper
Philippine court simply set aside a conviction of a lesser included offense and
held the defendant guilty of "homicide." 199 U.S. at 522.
13. 355 U.S. at 197.
14. 355 U.S. at 198.
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the dissenters state that the decision overrules Trono.15 For the position of the majority it can be said that Trono and related cases 16 dealt
with prosecution in a local court under local law, which makes those
cases analogous to state prosecution for a state offense. For the view of
the dissenting justices it can well be argued that the Trono type cases
are not similar to state prosecutions and that the lower federal courts
have not treated them as such but have used the Trono rationale in
7
federal prosecutions.'
Some note should be made of the fact that lower federal courts have
been following a position that has probably committed many to
harsher sentences on second trials, and if the Supreme Court is just
now iterating a principle it long thought settled, then there are many
who would think the proclamation belated. In the final analysis, however, the important question is whether the present decision is desirable and not whether the Supreme Court is overruling prior opinions
or deciding a case of first impression that is distinguishable from cases
that it has considered before. A compromise would be to restrain
the retrial to the lesser offense unless the error invalidates acquittal
of the greater offense. This would protect the individual from the
greater strength of the state and still allow retrial where the acquittal
of the greater offense was erroneous.

EVIDENCE-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-ADMISSIBILITY IN
FEDERAL COURTS OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH
WIRETAPPING BY STATE OFFICIALS
New York police, having obtained authority in accordance with
New York law to tap the wires of a telephone used by the defendant,'
15. 355 U.S. at 213.
16. See Carbonell v. People, 27 F.2d 253 (lst Cir. 1928), where defendant
was indicted for murder, found guilty of manslaughter, and appealed. After
reversal defendant was indicted for murder and found guilty of manslaughter
for a second time. The court declared it could "assume without deciding" that
the trial for murder could have prejudiced the defense, but in view of Trono
the error was immaterial.
17. See cases cited supra note 12. And the Court in deciding Trono treated
Trono as a case arising in a lower federal court of the continental United
States. A most striking example is the intermediate appellate court in the
instant case where the court was considering the defendant's appeal from
conviction of second degree murder:
"In seeking a new trial ... the jury will have no choice except to find him
guilty of first degree murder or to acquit him, Green is manifestly taking a
desperate chance." Green v. United States, 218 F.2d 856, 859. (D.C. Cir. 1955).
And see Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), where a prosecution was
begun in a federal court and then appealed by the defendant. The Supreme
Court allowed a retrial that resulted in a jury verdict death penalty after
a prior jury verdict without death penalty.
i. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.Y. CODE CRIl. PROC. § 813-a.
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overheard a conversation which led them to believe that the defendant
was engaged in transporting narcotics. Acting on this information,
they stopped a car in which eleven five-gallon cans of alcohol were
found. The defendant was turned over to federal authorities and was
convicted of illegal possession and transportation of alcohol without
federal tax stamps. 2 The conviction, which was based almost entirely
on the testimony of the New York police, was affirmed by the court of
appeals. On certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, held,
reversed. Under section 605 of the Communications Act of 19343 evidence obtained from wiretapping by state officials, even though in
accordance with state law, is not admissible in a federal court. Benanti
v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
Evidence gathered by federal officers through an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible
in federal court. 4 Such evidence is excluded only when obtained by
federal officers or by others in cooperation with them,5 or by state
officers for a federal purpose. 6 This evidence is not barred when acquired by a private party 7 or by state officers acting independently
of the federal government. 8
In Olmstead v. United States9 the Supreme Court held that evidence
obtained by wiretapping was not evidence obtained by unreasonable
search and seizure so as to be inadmissible in federal courts under
the fourth amendment. Thus, there was no barrier to the admission
of wiretap evidence until the enactment of section 605 of the Com2.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 5008(b) (1), 5642.
STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).

3. 48

4. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

5. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Lowery v. United States,

128 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1942).

6. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). New York police, acting
in behalf of the federal government, made an unlawful search of the defendant's car. Intoxicating liquor was found in the violation of the National
Prohibition Act. The Supreme Court held that admission of this evidence
violated the fourth and fifth amendments.
7. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
8. Serio v. United States, 203 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1953); Jaroshuk v. United
States, 201 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1953). Nor does fourth amendment exclusion
apply in state court prosecutions. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In this
case the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction where the evidence was ob-

tained through an unconstitutional search and seizure by state officials. The
Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not
require exclusion of the evidence. However, it should be noted in this connection that the Court will reject the use of such evidence where it is obtained in such a manner as to shock the conscience of the Court. Rochin v.
Califorina, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
.9. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The defendant here contended that this evidence
procured by federal officers through wiretapping, was inadmissible in federal
court. The Supreme Court with Brandeis, Holmes, Cardozo and Stone dissenting held wiretapping was not a search and seizure because there was no
entry on the premises of the defendant.
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munications Act of 1934.10 In Nardone v. United States" the Supreme
Court held that section 605 required exclusion of federally gathered
wiretap evidence in federal courts. The Court stated that the plain
words of the statute forbade anyone, unless authorized by the sender,
to intercept a telephone message.12 It also pointed out that the statute
made it equally clear that no person should divulge or publish the
message or its contents to any person. 13 The Court subsequently held
that evidence procured indirectly through information gained by wire14
tapping is likewise inadmissible in federal court.
In Schwartz v. Texas 15 the Supreme Court held that wiretap evidence gathered by state officials is admissible in state courts. The
instant case is the first to determine whether wiretap evidence obtained by state officials independently of federal officials is admissible
in federal court. The Court held that, following the interpretation
placed on section 605 of the Communications Act by the Nardone case,
evidence obtained in violation of that statute was inadmissible in
federal court whether secured by federal officers or state officers and
stated that distinctions designed to defeat the meaning of the statute
would not be tolerated. The government, referring to Schwartz v.
Texas and cases dealing with unreasonable search and seizure, urged
that the evidence was admissible because the wiretap occured without the knowledge or participation of federal officers. The Supreme
Court concluded that the Schwartz case was not in point because it
involved a state rule of evidence in a state proceeding. As an alternative argument to uphold the conviction the government argued that
no violation of section 605 had taken place because the wiretap was
done by state officials in accordance with state law.16 The government's
contention was that section 605 should not be interpreted to prevent
a state from authorizing such methods in furtherance of its police
functions. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that
10. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934). 47 U.S.C. 605 (1952). "[Nbo person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person ......
11. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
12. Id. at 382.
13. Ibid.
14. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). This second Nardone
case held that where unlawful wiretapping is involved not only are the
communications excluded but also the information gained as a result of the
wiretap is excluded. See Bernstein, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 37 ILL.
L. REv. 99 (1942). The Court has determined that this protection applies to
intrastate as well as interstate messages. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321,
329 (1939).
15. 344 U.S. 199 (1952). It is significant to note that after this decision
Texas amended its statute so as to make inadmissible evidence obtained in
violation of the laws of the United States. TEx. CODE CRIm. PRoc. ANN. art.
727a (Supp. 1957).
16. See note 1 supra.
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the Communications Act was comprehensive in nature, its policy being
to protect those interests set out in section 605, and that if Congress
had intended to make exceptions to the statute it would have done so.
The decision in the instant case expands the area which is within
the exclusionary protection of section 605. While the fourth amendment is a prohibition upon federal officials in their investigatory activities, the prohibition of section 605 of the Communications Act is
not expressly limited to federal government activity. The instant case
indicates that the Supreme Court will not interpret the act, by analogy to the prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure, as simply
a limitation on the acts of federal officials. Rather, the instant case
seems to establish section 605 as a broad exclusionary rule forbidding
the use of any wiretap evidence in federal courts. The result reached
in the instant case appears correct, for the statute contains a specific
prohibition against divulgence by anyone not authorized by the sender.
There will no doubt be many who consider this decision a severe blow
to law enforcement. The theme of their argument is that the right to
1
tap wires is necessary to combat organized crime. 7 While this may be
true, the answer lies in legislative modification of section 605 by
Congress. It is significant to note that the act stands unchanged despite
the clamor for reform from various law enforcement agencies.

EVIDENCE-WITNESSES-CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
HANDWRITING EXPERT WITH SPECIMENS
NOT ALREADY IN EVIDENCE
Defendant was convicted of forging the owner's name to a certificate of automobile title. The only evidence that defendant'was the
forger was the testimony of a handwriting expert who examined specimens of the defendant's and the owner's handwritings.' Upon appeal
defendant maintained that the lower court materially hampered his
cross-examination of this witness by refusing to allow him to confront
2
the expert with specimens of the owner's handwriting which had not
17. For this point of view see Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapving, 39 CoRNELL L.Q. 195 (1954); Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE
L.J. 792 (1954).
1. The owner of the car was defendant's wife, from whom he had been
separated for about six months. The certificate in question assigned title to
one John Bowman, but no one by that name could be found at the address
listed. On the same day of the supposed transfer the wife disappeared and
was not seen or heard from again.
2. Apparently the authenticity of the proposed testing specimens was not
in doubt.
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previously been introduced into evidence.3 Held, reversed. Refusal to
allow cross-examination of a handwriting expert by confrontation
with specimens of handwriting not previously introduced in evidence,
without determining whether the test could be concluded expeditiously
and without undue confusion is a prejudicial curtailment of the right
of cross-examination. New Jersey v. Bulna, 46 N.J. Super. 313, 134 A.2d
738 (App. Div. 1957).
Evidence of the authorship of an instrument by a comparison of
handwriting has long been resisted by the courts.4 At common law,
neither the layman nor the expert could testify from a comparison
of handwriting specimens. 5 Today it is no longer a prerequisite that
the witness have previous familiarity with the author's handwriting,
and both the expert and the trier of fact can compare handwriting
styles. 6 The great controversy centers on what specimens should be
allowed to be compared with the disputed writing. 7 Since a question
of the authorship of the offered specimens can arise, objections of unfairness, undue consumption of time and confusion of issues have led
many states to limit comparison to specimens which are "genuine," i.e.,
those written by the person whose handwriting is in issue-or to
specimens which are already in evidence. 8 Furthermore, comparison
is normally limited to those specimens which are conceded to be
"genuine,"9 or, in most states, those found by the trial judge to be
"genuine" on preliminary hearing.' 0 Since these same problems arise
where new specimens are offered for the purpose of cross-examination
of the expert, most courts have placed similar limitations on the use
of the specimens for this purpose. 1 However, other courts have found
3. The trial court refused to hear any explanation of the defendant's purpose
for submitting the specimens. In this appeal, however, it is stated that defendant's counsel offered the specimens twice; once for the purpose of testing
the witness's opinion as to the identity of the writer thereof with the writer
of the disputed assignment of certificate, and once to test his opinion as to
whether two such specimens were written by the same person. New Jersey v.
Bulna, 46 N.J. Super. 313, 134 A.2d 738, 742 (App. Div. 1957).
4. See 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1991-94 (3d ed. 1940).
5. Ibid. See also, MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 203 (1957). It was not

until the Common Law Procedure Acts in 1854 that such a comparison was
allowed in England. See Note, Authentication of Disputed Writings by Comparison: The Expert Witness, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 664 (1956).
6. This has been done generally by statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CrI. PROC.
§ 1944 (Deering 1953); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.25 (1950). However, in a few
cases comparison has been allowed without the aid of a statute. See State v.
Hastings, 53 N.H. 452, 461 (1873); State v. Ward, 39 Vt. 223, 233 (1867).
7. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 203 (1957).
8. Note 6 supra. See also, 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2016

(3d ed. 1940).
9. State v. Debner, 205 Iowa 25, 215 N.W. 721 (1927); Morrison v. Porter,
35 Minn. 425, 29 N.W. 54 (1886).
10. Omohundro v. State, 172 Tenn. 48, 109 S.W.2d 1159 (1937), 15 TENN.
L. REV. 251 (1938); State v. Thompson, 80 Me. 194, 13 At]. 892 (1888). For an
excellent discussion of the reasons for this additional limitation see University
of Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N.H. 163, 51 Atl. 731 (1901).
11. McArthur v. Citizens Bank, 223 Fed. 1004 (4th Cir. 1915) (requiring
specimens offered to be compared to be admitted or proven genuine); Rose v.
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that these objections may not be sufficient to outweigh the benefit to
12
be derived from the tests.
The instant court recognizes that the trial court does have discretion
to refuse the use of specimens of handwriting offered for crossexamination if the benefits to be derived from such a test are outweighted by dangers such as undue consumption of time and confusion
of issues. However, the court holds that the trial court cannot refuse
to allow the specimens solely on the ground that they are not already
in evidence. 13 Since the conviction here depended heavily on the
testimony of the expert, the disallowance of the cross-examination
without any attempt to see whether the test could be concluded expeditiously and without undue confusion was especially prejudicial.
The court further points out that restricting the defendant to the use
of those documents already employed during his direct examination
destroyed the very efficacy of the test since the expert was already
14
aware of their origin.
The willingness of some courts, including the court in the instant
case, to relax the rigid limitations on the use of handwriting specimens
on cross-examination appears to be attributable to two important factors. The first of these is the recognition that modern courts no longer
consider the opinion testimony of handwriting experts as a low order
of evidence. 15 The second is the great potentiality of such tests for
discovery of the unqualified or "pseudo" expert who tends to lean the
way his client wishes to go.16 A question with which the instant court
was not faced is whether courts are justified in limiting the testing on
cross-examination solely to specimens written by the person whose
handwriting is in issue. If the theory behind admitting any writings
not otherwise in the case is that the expert has had plenty of time to
study the characteristics of the handwriting of the parties involved,
and should be able to recognize those same characteristics in the new
specimens submitted, it is arguable that this same reasoning could
First Nat'l Bank, 91 Mo. 399, 3 S.W. 876 (1887) (requiring specimens already

to be in evidence). See Annot., 128 A.L.R. 1329, 1337 (1940).
12. Hoag v. Wright, 174 N.Y. 36, 66 N.E. 579 (1903).

13. 134 A.2d at 743.
14. Ibid.
15. For a long period of time it was felt that the opinion of the handwriting
expert was inferior to the ordinary person who had seen the party write,
.even though only once, or had corresponded with him. This was perhaps due
to the fact that witnesses were accepted as experts who knew little or nothing
about scientific analysis. With modem research techniques the expert's opinion
is much more reliable than the layman's. For a demonstration that the characteristics of each specimen can be clearly shown by use of proper scientific
methods, see OSBORN,

QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS

(2d ed. 1929).

For a criticism

of the opinion of lay witnesses based on memory, see Inbau, Lay Witness
Identification of Handwriting, 34 ILL. L. REV. 433 (1939).
16. For a recognition that there are entirely too many of this type of expert,
see Swett, How to Select and When To Employ A Handwriting Expert, 14

ALA. LAW. 142, 143 (1953).
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be applied regardless of whether the specimens are "genuine" or not.
Of course, after the new specimen is introduced, if the opposing party
doubts its authorship and the other is put to his proof, the dangers of
undue consumption of time and confusion of issues may again arise.17
No set rule should be adopted. It should be left within the trial judge's
discretion to determine whether the purposes for which the samples
are offered are of sufficient merit to outweigh the dangers involved.' 8

FAIR TRADE LAWS-ROBINSON PATMAN ACTCIVIL ACTION FOR TREBLE DAMAGES FOR SELLING
AT UNREASONABLY LOW PRICES
In a civil action in a United States District Court, treble damages
and injunctive relief were sought, under sections 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act, 1 for injuries allegedly suffered by reason of the respondent's sales at unreasonably low prices in violation of section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act.2 The complaint was dismissed on the ground
that private remedies afforded by sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act are not available to redress of violation of section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act. The court of appeals affirmed the order of dis17. Since the court can limit the number of new specimens to be introduced,
these dangers can be avoided to some extent.
18. This is apparently the view taken by Professor McCormick. "It seems
that any one who claims to be an expert should be subject to a testing of his
claim on cross-examination by presenting him with true and fabricated writings and asking him to distinguish. Since in fairness he may properly request
time for examination and testing, the judge should have a discretion to say
whether under the circumstances the test is worth the time it will take."
McCoR-,ICK, EVIDENcE 367 (1954).
'qt is better to take a little time to see whether the opinion of the witness is
worth anything, rather than to hazard life, liberty, or property upon an
opinion that is worth nothing." Hoag v. Wright, 174 N.Y. 36, 66 N.E. 579, 581
(1903).
1. 38 STAT. 731, 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1952). Section 4 of the
Clayton Act provides: "That any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount
in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Section 16 of the Clayton Act grants a private cause of action for injunctive
relief against "threatened loss or violation of the antitrust laws."
2. 49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952). Section 3 of the RobinsonPatman Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any
transaction of sale, or contract to sell . . . goods at unreasonably low prices
for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
"Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall, upon
conviction threof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both."
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missal,3 and certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court.4 Held,
affirmed. Congress did not, by amendment, make section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act a part of the Clayton Act, nor is section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act an antitrust law as embraced in section 1 of
the Clayton Act; 5 therefore, a practice which is forbidden solely by
section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, namely, to sell "at unreasonably
low prices for the purpose of destroying competition," is not subject
to civil redress under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. Nashville
Milk Co. v. CarnationCo., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
The Robinson-Patman Act was the product of two distinct bills
introduced in Congress at about the same time for the purpose of
maintaining the plane of business competition best suited for a healthy
economy by deterring price discrimination and its effects. 6 Because
of the similarity of purposes, the two bills were combined,7 notwithstanding the fact that the respective methods used to effectuate those
purposes were civil in the one bill and criminal in the other.8 Section
1 of the Robinson-Patman Act expressly amended the Clayton Act, and
thus the civil remedies available for a violation of the Clayton Act
became applicable to it. Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act was
criminal in nature. The question immediately arose whether, section
3 was also an amendment to the Clayton Act, thereby affording civil
redress for a violation of it under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act,
or whether its enforcement was left exclusively to criminal sanctions. 9
There was very little civil litigation based on section 3 for several
3. 238 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.,4956).
4. To resolve a conflict between the principal case and Vance v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 239 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1956).
5. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1952). Section 1 of the Clayton Act
provides: "That 'antitrust laws,' as used herein, includes the Act entitled
'An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies,' approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety. ....
"
6. The Borah-Van Nuys bill, S. 4171, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), a close
copy of the Canadian Price Discrimination Act, Canada Stat. 25 & 26 GEo. V, c.
56, § 9 (1935), was introduced for the purpose of subjecting discriminatory
business practices to penal consequences. It was subsequently added without
alteration to the Patman bill. H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
The Robinson-Patman bill was introduced as an amendment to the Clayton
Act for the purpose of abolishing blanket immunities for quality discounts.
See Hearings Before the House Judiciary Committee on Bills to Amend the
Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 214, 248, 257-58 (1935).
7. The Borah-Van Nuys bill became § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. 49
STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952).
8. Section 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1952), expressly amends § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952), and is therefore an "antitrust law" as defined in § 1
of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1952), for which civil
remedies for injuries resulting from its violation are permitted by §§ 4 and
16 of the Clayton Act. 38 STAT. 731, 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26 (1952).
9. For the view that civil actions are possible for a violation of § 3, see 80
CONG. REc. 9420, 9421, 9903 (1936). Contra, 80 CONG. REC. 9419, 9421 (1936);
H.R. RrP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
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years,10 and it was not until the Supreme Court indicated that a civil
action would lie for a violation of this section that such civil litigation
substantially increased." Subsequently, in the leading case of Balian
Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co.,12 a federal district court expressly
held that the Congressional purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was
to create an instrument of antitrust enforcement. The lower federal
courts, relying largely on the Balian case, have been in general agreement that section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act was an amendment
to the Clayton Act and that civil remedies for its violation were pro13
vided by sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.
The decision of the majority in the instant case is a clear reversal
of the position held by the lower federal courts and of the view indicated by the Supreme Court's own dicta that a private remedy is
available under the Clayton Act for a violation of section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act. 4 By employing basic rules of statutory in10. The reason apparently being that most legal and business communities
considered that § 3 provided only criminal sanctions. Gordon, RobinsonPatmanAnti-DiscriminationAct: The Meaning of Sections 1 and 3, 22 A.B.A.J.
593, 649 (1936); Hamilton & Loevinger, The Second Attack On Price Disrrimination: The Robinson-Patman Act. 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 153. 182 (1936);
Notes, 50 HARV. L. REV. 106, 121, 122 (1937); 85 U. PA. L. REv. 306, 312 (1937).

11. The first case to allow civil redress under § 3 was decided in 1942.
Atlantic Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 44 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Tex. 1942). The action was
not based solely on the Robinson-Patman Act, but the court indicated that
one may invoke the provisions of § 3 of that act in a private action "if he

can allege and prove injury proximately caused by such violations."
The Supreme Court indicated by dicta that such an action would lie. Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 750 (1947). See also Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 117 (1954): accord, Spencer v. Sun Oil
Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950); Gordon, Wolf, Cowen Co. v. Independent
Halvah & Candies, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also, Moore v.
Mead Service Co., 184 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950); Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice
& Coal Storage Co., 178 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949); A. J. Goodman & Son v.
United Lacauer Vffg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D. Mass. 1949). Contra. National
Used Car Market Report, Inc. v. National Auto Dealers Ass'n, 108 F. Supp. 692
(D.D.C. 1951).
12. 94 Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1950). In construing the Robinson-Patman Act
in its entirety to be an amendment to the Clayton Act, it was said, "Whether
an act is amendatory of existing law is determined not by title alone, or
by declarations in the new act that it purports to amend existing law. On the
contrary, it is determined by an examination and comparison of its provisions
with existing law. If its aim is to clarify or correct uncertainties which arose
from the enforcement of the existing law, or to reach situations which were
not covered by the original statute, the act is amendatory, even though in its
wording it does not purport to amend the language of the prior act. Whatever
supplements existing legislation, in order to achieve more successfully the
societal object sought to be obtained may be said to amend it." Id. at 798.
13. Because of the vagueness of the phrase "unreasonably low prices" of §
3, some question has been raised concerning the constitutionality of section
3 as a criminal statute. See Louisiana Farmers' Protective Union, Inc. v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 131 F.2d. 419, 422 (8th Cir. 1942); F. & A. Ice Cream
Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 98 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Cal. 1951); United States v.
Bowman Dairy Co., 89 F. Supp. 112, 114 (N.D. Ill. 1949). See also, Waldes
Kohinoor, Inc. v. Stabile, 140 F. Supp. 916, 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Hershel
California Fruit Products Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Cal.
1954); Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670, 674 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Comment,
55 MirH. L. REV. 845, 848 (1957); 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 285, 292 (1954).
14. See notes 11, 12 and 13, supra.
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terpretation, the Supreme Court held that the first section of the
Robinson-Patman Act, and only the first section, is amendatory of
the Clayton Act;15 that sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act
are separate and distinct provisions standing on their own footing
and carrying their own sanctions; 16 and that a violator of section 3
must be prosecuted under the provisions of that section exclusively,
17
and specifically not under any provisions of the Clayton Act. In spite
of the overlapping provisions of section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act and section 2 of the Clayton Act,'8 it was determined that the
Robinson-Patman Act is not ambiguous on its face in regard to its
dual purpose; 19 that the title of the act clearly supports this interpretation;20 and that the legislative history of the act lends further support to this view 2 1
In consideration of the chaotic legislative history of section 3 and of
the diametrically opposing results of the numerous judicial attempts
to interpret it on the basis of its history,22 an analysis of the decision
of the Supreme Court in the instant case must necessarily look to the
four corners of the statute alone. The purpose of this statute is to
avoid harmful economic effects from unfair business competition, and
hence to protect the public in general. Its sanctions are expressly
criminal. Therefore, the only source from which a civil remedy may
spring must be from its own provisions in conjunction with general
law, and not from a similarity between its language and another
distinct statute which does allow civil remedies. The Court here was
15. See note 8 supra.

16. 355 U.S. at 376. Section 2 applies the amending provisions of § 1 to
litigation commenced under the former provisions of § 2 of the Clayton Act.
49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 21a (1952).
Section 4 applies to certain practices of cooperative associations. 49 STAT.
1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13b. (1952).
17. 'Turther, § 3 contains only penal sanctions for violation of its provisions;
in the absence of a clear expression of Congressional intent to the contrary,
these sanctions should under familiar principals be considered exclusive,
rather than supplemented by civil sanctions of a distinct statute." Instant
case, 355 U.S. at 377. See also, D. R. Wilder 1fg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining
Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915).
18. There is a partial overlap between the price discrimination clauses of
§ 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952),
and § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1952).
19. The first section of the Robinson-Patman Act reads: "That section 2 of
the (Clayton Act) ...

is amended to read as follows: .

.

." This entire section

is set forth in quotation marks and no other section his either the same introductory phrase or the quotation marks. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1952).
20. The title of the Robinson-Patman Act reads:
"An Act
"To amend section 2 of [Clayton Act]

. . .

and for other purposes." 49 STAT.

1526 (1936). (Emphasis added.)
21. See 80 CONG. REc. 9419, 9421 (1936); H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1936).
22. See note 9 supra.
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not dealing with the question of whether a civil action for single
damages is afforded by this section, but has limited itself exclusively
to the determination that, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, it could find no legislative intent that the civil remedies of the
Clayton Act are applicable to a violation of section 3 of the RobinsonPatman Act. Therefore, the mere fact that the enforcement agencies
of the government have seldom used the section, and that there is
some question concerning its constitutional validity as a criminal
statute, 23 does not empower the court to supplement it with a remedy
from another distinct statute where there is no clear manifestation of
legislative intent. If this decision renders section 3 ineffective as either
a criminal or civil statute, then it is a result that only the legislature
can remedy.

PARTNERSHIP-CREDITORS' RIGHTS-LIABILITY OF A
PARTNER FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED TO ENTER
INTO THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
Appellant was induced to enter into a partnership agreement' by the
fraudulent representations of the other partners. 2 He was inactive
and the reputation of the partnership was due in no way to his connection with it since the creditors were unaware that he was a partner.3 On petition for involuntary bankruptcy by partnership creditors, 4 the partnership and all partners except appellant 5 were de-

clared bankrupt. The appellant, contesting the referee's finding of
his personal liability for firm debts under the Colorado Uniform
23. See note 13 supra.
1. The referee specifically found that the appellant was induced to become
a partner by the fraudulent representations of two of the four Smiths, who
with the appellant made up the partnership of T. C. Smith & Son.
2. Van Andel was a partner from April 21, 1955, to July 9, 1955, when the
partnership was dissolved by mutual consent without an accounting or winding up.
3. The referee found that: "'[A]s to the petitioning creditors, when their
debts were contracted, John J. Van Andel was unknown to them as a partner
and was so far unknown and inactive in the affairs of the partnership that
the business reputation of the partnership could not be said to have been in
any degree due to his connection with it.'" Van Andel v. Smith, 248 F.2d
915, 919 (10th Cir. 1957).
4. The petitioning creditors said that their debts were contracted as follows:
(1) Hallack and Howard, between August 29, and October 31, 1955.
(2) George Wafer, between March 12, and July 12, 1955.
(3) W. D. Woodside Company, between April 1, and December 1, 1955.
All these creditors were found to have been doing business with the partnership before April 21, 1955.
5. The referee found that Van Andel was solvent as an individual, and that
as to him personally there were not three petitioning creditors as required.
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Partnership Act,6 contended that the adjudication of bankruptcy
was erroneous as the presence of fraud voided the partnership ab
initio thus relieving him of any liability.7 Held, affirmed. A partner who
is induced to enter into an existing partnership through fraud of the
other partners is liable to creditors for debts incurred while he is a
partner, even though the defrauded partner was inactive and'unknown
to the creditors. Van Andel v. Smith, 248 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957).
The members of an ordinary partnership are jointly liable for the
partnership debts.8 Their's is an unlimited liability, regardless of any
agreements among themselves. 9 When a judgment is obtained against
the partnership and all its members for a firm debt, execution thereon
can be levied either on the partnership assets or upon the property
or any partner. 0 Upon bankruptcy, partnership liabilities are first
met out of partnership assets, and only when these prove insufficient
are the personal assets of the several partners distributed."
There is a division of opinion in the few decisions mentioning the
point as to whether a partnership is void ab initio2 or voidable 13 when
one partner is induced by fraud to enter into the partnership agree6. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §

§ 104-1-39 (1953). This section, which adopts
39, provides:
"Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground of the fraud or
misrepresentation of one of the parties thereto, the party entitled to rescind
is, without prejudice to any other right, entitled:
"(1) To a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of the partnership
property after satisfying the partnership liabilities to third persons for
any sum of money paid by him for the purchase of an interest in the partnership and for any capital or advances contributed by him; and
"(2) To stand, after all liabilities to third persons have been satisfied,
in the place of the creditors of the partnership for any payments made by
him in respect of the partnership liabilities; and
"(3) To be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud or making the
representation against all debts and liabilities of the partnership."
7. The court rejected appellant's contention that the adjudication was erroneous in that there were not three creditors as required by the Bankruptcy
Act because one of the debts was incurred after the dissolution of the partnership.
8. See Hall v. Lanning, 91 U.S. 160 (1875); Kent v. National Supply Co., 36
S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). UNIFORM PARTNERSmP ACT § 15 codifies
the common-law liability of partners as to the contractual obligations of the
partnership, making the partners jointly liable for obligations incurred in
the ordinary course of business. The Uniform Act creates the tenancy in
partnership by § 25 thereof. This is a unique form of ownership that supersedes
the common-law theory of a joint tenancy.
9. See Weaver v. Oliver, 40 S.W.2d 984 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931);1 BARRETT &
SEAGO, PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS

c. 3, § 8.2 (1956).

10. Webb v. Gregory, 108 S.W.478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908). Where a partner
pays more than his pro rata share of the partnership debts, he is entitled to
contribution from a co-partner. Goldring v. Chudacoff, 15 Cal. App. 2d 741, 60
P.2d 135 (1936).

11. See 52

STAT.

845 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 23(g) (1952);

COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY

§ 5.26 (14th ed. 1940).
12. Oteri v. Scalzo, 145 U.S. 578 (1892); Long v. Newlin, 144 Cal. App. 2d 509,
301 P.2d 271 (1956); 68 C.J.S., Partnership § 13b (1950).
13. Hynes v. Stewart & Owens, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 429 (1850); Perry v.
Hale, 143 Mass. 540, 10 N.E. 174 (1887); Grossman v. Lewis, 226 Mass. 163,

115 N.E. 236 (1917).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11

ment. Dicta in these cases indicate that when the partnership is con-

sidered to have had existence until it is brought to an end by recission
of otherwise, the defrauded partner is liable whether he held himself
out as a partner or not.14 On the other hand, if the partnership is considered void ab initio the indication is that the partner is liable only if
he held himself out as a partner, that is, on an estoppel theory.1 The
present court construed section 39 of the Uniform Partnership Act to
mean that a partnership induced by fraud is voidable rather than
void ab initio as appellant contended. Section 39 states that, upon recission of a partnership contract for fraud or misrepresentation
the defrauded partner is entitled to a lien on surplus partnership property, to stand as a creditor after liabilities to third parties have been
satisfied, and to be indemnified by the defrauding parties against all
debts and liabilities of the partnership. 16 Since these rights are created
by section 39, the court inferred that the partnership entity must have
come into existence and even though the partner was unknown and
7
defrauded, he was liable for firm debts.'
A careful reading of section 39 leads to the conclusion that it states
the rights of a defrauded partner and not his duties to the creditors of
the partnership. 18 The cases that have been decided under this section
of the act deal with relations between the partners themselves, 19 and
14. See note 13 supra. Normally, a dormant partner is liable for firm debts
incurred while he was a member even though there was no representation
that he was a partner; see Schwaegler Co. v. Marchesotti, 88 Cal. App. 2d 738,
199 P.2d 331 (1948); Dygert v. Hansen, 31 Wash. 2d 858, 199 P.2d 596 (1948).
15. Long v. Newlin, 144 Cal. App. 2d 509, 301 P.2d 271, 273 (1956) (dictum).
16. See note 6 supra.
17. The court construes § 39 to mean that a partnership is brought into
existence even in the face of fraud and the defrauded partner is liable to
creditors: "As we read it, the statute means that even though the partnership
contract was procured by the fraud of one of the partners, nevertheless the
partnership entity is created and until it is dissolved the defrauded partner
is liable for debts of the partnership to third persons incurred during the
life of the partnership.... While a defrauded partner may rescind for fraud,
he remains liable to creditors who dealt with the partnership during its
existence." 248 F.2d at 918. (Emphasis added.)
18. To support its construction that § 39 creates a liability to creditors on
the part of the defrauded partner, the court cites two Massachusetts cases that
are not concerned with the question of creditors rights; see 248 F.2d at 918
n. 7. Perry v. Hale, 143 Mass. 540, 10 N.E. 174 (1887), deals with an action
by one defrauded stockholder against other shareholders for the price of
stock in a "corporation" that had never been incorporated. The court held
that there was no corporation and applied partnership law; the discussion of
partners' liability to creditors is dictum. Grossman v. Lewis, 226 Mass. 163,
115 N.E. 236 (1917), concerns a suit between partners to end a partnership; no
creditor was a party to the action. In the case at bar, the court distinguished
the appellant's cases on the theory that they did not involve third parties; see
248 F.2d at 918. Logically the two cited cases should be distinguished on the
same basis.
19. Long v. Newlin, 144 Cal. App. 2d 509, 301 P.2d 271 (1957); Gardner v.
Shreve, 89 Cal. App. 2d 804, 202 P.2d 322 (1949); Adamo v. Nicholas, 13 Cal.
App. 2d 261, 56 P.2d 985 (1936); Levin v. Hurwitz, 148 Md. 249, 129 Atl. 218
(1925); Brownback v. Nelson, 122 Mont. 525, 206 P.2d 1017 (1949); Alcorn v.
Kohler, 203 Ore. 19, 277 P.2d 1009 (1954); Jefferies v. Jefferies, 387 Pa. 234,
127 A.2d 657 (1956).

1958]

RECENT CASES

not with partner-creditor relations. The statute makes no statement
that the defrauded partner is under any obligation to pay partnership debts. Perhaps the court should have clarified its decision by
examining the dicta in the partnership cases in its effort to support
a theory of liability to third parties. The holding in this case is
particularly harsh in light of the fact that this defrauded partner was
unknown to the creditors. Such a result can be avoided by amending
the Uniform Act to provide expressly that a person who is fraudulently
induced to enter into a partnership agreement shall be liable for
partnership debts only when he holds himself out to creditors as a
partner.

WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-SUBTERRANEAN
PERCOLATING WATERS-ACTION TO ENJOIN USE
WHICH IMPAIRS ADJOINING LANDOWNER'S USE
The plaintiffs own and reside upon land which joins that owned
by one of the defendants. This defendant has seven water wells upon
his ten acre property. The water from these wells is used to supplement that drawn from other sources for use in the co-defendant's
chicken processing plant. Plaintiffs allege that prior to the drilling
and use of the seven wells by the defendant there was an abundant
supply of water for domestic purposes in their own wells; that while
defendant's wells are in production plaintiff's wells go dry; and that
when defendant's wells are not in use water again returns to plaintiff's wells. Plaintiffs sue to enjoin the use of defendant's wells for
providing the plant with water. On appeal from a decree in favor of
defendants, held, reversed. Use of such large amounts of percolating
water as to leave an adjoining landowners insufficient water for domestic purposes is "unreasonable" and will be enjoined. Jones v.
Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 306 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. 1957).
All underground waters, except where otherwise provided by statute, are regarded in law as either flowing or percolating.' In the absence of proof to the contrary, a well will be presumed to be fed by
percolating water.2 Although there can be no ownership of percolating
1. Hathorn v. Dr. Strong's Saratoga Springs Sanitarium, 55 Misc. 445, 106
N.Y.S. 553 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
2. Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1936). The term
"percolating waters" includes all waters which pass through the ground beneath
the surface of the earth without a definite channel and are not shown to be
supplied by a definite flowing stream; percolating waters are those which
seep, ooze, filter and otherwise circulate through the subsurface strata. United
Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953); Pence v. Carney, 58 W.
Va. 296, 52 S.E. 702 (1905).
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water in the absolute sense, because of its wandering and migratory
character,3 the owner of land has a property right in percolating water
beneath the surface of that land.4 Ownership becomes absolute once
the water is reduced to actual control and possession by the person
claiming it.5 In respect to the use of percolating waters by the owner
of land from which it is drawn, several different rules are applied in
the United States.6 The English view, adopted in some American jurisdictions,7 is that the land owner may drain off all water found
under his land, and any resulting inconvenience to adjoining
property falls within the description of damnum absque injuria and
is not the basis of an action.8 Thus a landowner may tap percolating
water beneath his property even to the extent of lowering the water
level on adjoining property. 9 However, this rule is limited in both
England and the United States by the equitable doctrine which requires one to use his property, if at all possible, so as not to injure
his neighbor's property.10 In some states the English view, followed
in early decisions," has given way to the reasonable use rule, or the
American rule,12 which limits the use of percolating water to such
amounts as may be necessary and reasonable for some beneficial purpose in connection with the land from which it is taken. 13 When the
3. Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 83 Utah 545, 31 P.2d

624 (1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 742 (1935).
4.Rank v.Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Gross v. MacCornack,
75 Ariz. 243, 255 P.2d 183 (1953).

5. Campbell v. Willard, 45 Ariz. 221, 42 P.2d 403 (1935); Utah Copper Co.
v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 83 Utah 545, 31 P.2d 624 (1934), cert. denied,
295 U.S.742 (1935).
6. The doctrine of prior appropriation is to be distinguished from those
doctrines applicable to percolating water. Under this doctrine one who
first diverts water from a stream and applies it to beneficial use has a prior
right thereto, to the extent of his appropriation. Arizona v. California, 283
U.S. 423 (1931). It is generally held that this doctrine is applicable only to
waters that are publici juris and is not applied to percolating waters. Howard
v. Perrin, 200 U.S. 71 (1906); Annots., 109 A.L.R. 395, 408 (1937); 55 A.L.R.
1385, 1444 (1928).
7.See Annots., 109 A.L.R. 395, 397 (1937); 55 A.L.R. 1385, 1390 (1928).
8. Gallerani v. United States, 41 F. Supp.293 (D.Mass. 1941).
9. Victor A. Harder Realty & Const. Co. v. City of New York, 64 N.Y.S.2d
310 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
10. "[F]or unavoidable damage to another's land, in the lawful use of one's
own, no action can be maintained .... But the rule does not go beyond proper
use and unavoidable damage. . . . 'Every man has the right to the natural
use and enjoyment of his own property; and if,while lawfully in such use
and enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss
occurs to his neighbor, itis damnum absque injuria." Collins v. Chartiers
Val. Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18 Atl. 1012 (1890). From this itwould appear that
an action would lie if the damage were caused through negligence or malice.
See also Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 Atl. 627 (1934).
11. Ocean Grove Camp-Meeting Ass'n v. Commissioners, 40 N.J. Eq. 447, 3
Atl. 168 (Ch.1885).
12. P. Ballantine & Sons v. Public Serv. Corp., 86 N.J.L. 331, 91 Atl. 95
(1914). See also, Annots., 109 A.L.R. 395, 399 (1937); 55 A.L.R. 1385, 1398
(1928).
13. Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173 (1953); Peabody v. City
of Vallejo,2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935).
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use has no relation to the land-e.g., a sale-it will be held to be unreasonable if it impairs or limits an adjoining landowner's supply of
water.1 4 This rule should be contrasted with the reasonable use rule
generally applied to determine rights of riparian owners on surface
streams. While the former generally looks only to the reasonableness of the use by the consumer in relation to his land, the latter
looks to the rights of the consumer in relation to the rights of upper
and lower riparian owners.15 This is very similar to the correlative
rights doctrine, applied to percolating waters in some American jurisdictions. 16 Under the correlative rights doctrine the rights of all landowners over a common saturated area are coequal or correlative and
one cannot use more than his share, even for the benefit of his own
1
land, where others' rights are injured by such use. 7
The court in the instant case applied the riparian reasonable use
rule to percolating waters. "As to water rights of riparian owners,
this state has adopted the reasonable use rule .... We see no good
reason why this same rule should not apply to a true subterranean
stream or to subterranean percolating waters."18 Whether or not
any given use is reasonable depends upon the circumstances of the
particular case. In this case the court, noting that plaintiffs' land had
little value except for domestic purposes, held that it was unreasonable
for defendants to use thousands of gallons of water each day for
processing chickens if such use deprived plaintiffs of sufficient water
for domestic needs. Since the rule applied by the court takes into
consideration the resulting effect upon landowners who draw from
a common source of supply, it would seem that the result reached
14. Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940).

15. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); Colorado
v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, (1943); Charnock v. Higuerra, 111 Cal. 473, 44 Pac.
171 (1896); City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902). See
also 56 Av. Jua., Waters § 274 (1947). It should be noted that the rights and
liabilities in regard to running surface streams differ in several important
respects from those in regard to percolating waters.' The corpus of running
water in a natural stream is not subject to private ownership as is the corpus
of percolating water; but when percolating water escapes to another's
property, the title of the former owner is gone. Rock Creek Ditch & Flume

Co. v. Miller, 93 Mont. 248, 17 P.2d 1074 (1933). Percolating water as distinguished from surface running water is a portion of the soil itself and be-

longs to the owner of the land. Gould v. Eaton, 111 Cal. 639, 44 Pac. 319

(1896). See also 56 Am. Jui., Waters § 111 (1947).
16. O'Leary v. Herbert, 5 Cal.2d 416, 55 P.2d 834 (1936); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663 (1902); Cason v. Florida Power Co., 74 Fla.
1, 76 So. 535 (1917); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446,
89 S.W.2d 889 (1935); Justesen v. Olsen, 86 Utah 158, 40 P.2d 802 (1935).
17. O'Leary v. Herbert, 5 Cal.2d 416, 55 P.2d 834 (1936). The phrases "reasonable use" and "correlative rights" are frequently used interchangeably
with reference to percolating waters. Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255
P.2d 173 (1953); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 Pac. 766 (1902); Annot.,
55 A.L.R. 1385, 1399 (1928); cf. Erickson v. Crookston, Water Works Power
and L. Co., 105 Minn. 182, 117 N.W. 435 (1908); Vanderwork v. Hewes, 15 N.M.

439, 110 Pac. 567 (1910).
18. 306 S.W.2d at 113.
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is very similar to that which would be reached by application of the
correlative rights rule.
Because of the widespread drought in many areas in recent years,
questions concerning rights in available water are becoming more
important. Indeed several states have enacted statutes applicable to
questions that arise in this area.19 The court in the instant case, having
no statute upon which to rely, correctly realized that the test used
should take into consideration the resulting effect upon the rights of
others. It would also seem that there is no good reason for distinguishing between percolating water rights and riparian water rights if
the test as applied to one reaches just and desirable results when applied to the other. This the court also recognized, and its decision
would seem to simplify somewhat the law in this respect.
19. E.g. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-141 to -154 (1954); CAL. WATER CODE
ANN. (Deering 1944); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-1801 to -1849 (Supp. 1957).

